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ARTICLES
THE ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT DEBATE:
MORE LIGHT, LESS HEAT
Nadia N. Sawicki*
One of the most notable developments in American abortion policy
is the expansion of state abortion informed consent policies. South Da-
kota, for example, now requires physicians to state that the abortion will
"termiriate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being. "
Oklahoma law prohibits a medical provider from performing an abortion
unless she has first performed an ultrasound, "display[ed] the ultra-
sound images so that the pregnant woman may view them, " and provided
a verbal description thereof Such laws have faced significant criticism
from medical ethicists and legal scholars, who argue that the laws are
ideologically motivated and fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine
of informed consent.
While recognizing the potentially dubious nature of these new re-
quirements, this Article contends that the current articulation of the ar-
gument from informed consent does not serve critics' purposes as
effectively as they might hope. Contrary to popular belief the doctrine
of informed consent provides limited guidance about appropriate proce-
dures in the clinical context-including what information must be dis-
closed, how it should be disclosed, and the motivations of the discloser.
Rather, as this Article demonstrates, informed consent is and has always
been a socially constructed doctrine, one highly dependent on implicit
value judgments that are just now being made explicit in the context of
elective abortion.
By emphasizing a more nuanced understanding of informed con-
sent, this Article aims to defuse and civilize the heated debate surround-
ing the new breed of abortion disclosure requirements. More
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importantly, it offers critics the opportunity to bolster their challenges to
some of the most problematic provisions, such as those requiring disclo-
sure of disputed factual information, those requiring disclosure of non-
medically material information in the clinical context, and those requir-
ing patients to view information or images against their will. Finally, it
encourages critics to shift their emphasis from informed consent-based
arguments towards potentially more persuasive arguments grounded in
public policy and constitutional theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Issues surrounding the regulation of abortion are among the most
pressing in modern American health care policy. The passage of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), for example, was
delayed in no small part due to concerns that government funds might be
used to pay for elective abortions or that state insurance exchanges might
include insurance plans that cover abortions. In this long-standing policy
debate, abortion opponents are taking a new approach. At both the state
and the federal levels, legislators have proposed bills that impose specific
informed consent and disclosure requirements upon medical providers
who treat women seeking abortions. South Dakota, for example, now
standardizes the informed consent language that physicians must use, re-
quiring disclosure that the abortion will "terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being."' Oklahoma prohibits a medical
provider from performing an abortion unless he has first performed an
ultrasound, "display[ed] the ultrasound images so that the pregnant wo-
man may view them," and provided a verbal description of what the ul-
trasound depicts. 2
In adopting the language of informed consent to support these pro-
posals, legislators face significant criticism from the academic commu-
nity, which has decried these laws as biased and overtly ideological.
Scholars of law, medicine, and ethics argue that the new disclosure re-
quirements are fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine of informed
consent, which obligates physicians to provide patients with sufficient
information to make autonomous and educated decisions about their
medical care. 3 Even some courts have criticized these new laws as vio-
1 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2004); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976-77 (D.S.D. 2009) affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, --- F.3d ---- , 2011 WL 3862585 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding
constitutionality of the "relationship disclosure").
2 OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (2004). Enforcement of this law, however, has been
temporarily enjoined since May 2010 in connection with a legal challenge by Nova Health
Systems. See Tim Talley, Judge Extends Order Blocking Oklahoma Abortion Law, Associ-
ATED PRESS, July 20, 2010, http://www.cnsnews.com/node/69613.
3 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice
in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1599 (2007); Robert M. Godzeno, The Role of
Ultrasound Imaging in Informed Consent Legislation Post-Gonzales v. Carhart, 27 QuIN-
NIPIAc L. REv. 285, 323 (2009) (describing abortion disclosure laws as "not really informed
consent" laws); Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies
and the Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, GuTrMACHER POL'Y REv., Fall 2007, at
6-8 ("[T~he use of the informed consent process in this way clearly runs counter to fundamen-
tal ethical principles that have long guided the practice of medicine."); Maya Manian, The
Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 223, 225-26 (2009); Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted
Consent: When Medical Ethics and Law Collide, 39(5) HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 2009,
at 21; Chinue Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accu-
racy of States Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV., Fall
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lating traditional theories of informed consent.4 In article after article,
authors refer to abortion disclosure requirements as "'informed consent'
laws," using scare quotes to highlight the apparent contradiction in
terms. 5
Despite the potentially dubious nature of these new laws, arguments
from informed consent-at least as they are currently framed-do not
provide the most effective challenge to abortion informed consent laws.6
This Article demonstrates that the ethical theory of informed consent ac-
tually provides very limited guidance about appropriate procedures in the
clinical context. In fact, most guidance about how to approach the in-
formed consent process has developed in the context of empirical re-
search and clinical practice. While such sources clearly illustrate the
merits of certain disclosure procedures as compared to others, they also
reveal the richness and flexibility of both the theory and practice of in-
formed consent, which is rarely reflected in many commentators' ideal-
ized conceptions of informed consent.7
Unfortunately, contemporary writers-including legislators-often
use the phrase "informed consent" as shorthand for a concept that readers
are presumed to, but may not in fact, understand. Not surprisingly, the
language of the recent health reforms falls into this trap as well. PPACA
does not define informed consent or recognize the flexibility inherent in
its application; it references informed consent only once, in a prohibition
2006, at 6; Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008).
4 See Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 423 (N.J. 2007) (holding that physicians have no
common law duty to inform women seeking abortions that an embryo is "a complete, separate,
unique and irreplaceable human being" and that terminating an early pregnancy involves "ac-
tually killing an existing human being").
5 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of
Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) ("1
suggest that the sort of emotional information that many states now provide in their 'informed
consent' statutes can lead to such inappropriate emotional influence and thus should be ex-
amined more closely than heretofore."); Zita Lazzarini, South Dakota's Abortion
Script-Threatening the Physician-Patient Relationship, 359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2189, 2189-90
(2008) ("The 'informed consent' law was passed in 2005 [in South Dakota.]"); Manian, supra
note 3, at 226 ("Abortion law invokes and then misuses 'informed consent' terminology.");
Richardson & Nash, supra note 3, at 6 ("States have been enacting 'informed consent' man-
dates specific to abortion for decades . . . .").
6 In this Article, references to "abortion disclosure laws" and "abortion informed con-
sent laws" are interchangeable. This language was chosen because of its common usage; it is
not intended for this phrasing to either validate or disparage these laws. This Article also uses
the phrase "the argument from informed consent" to reference the argument that abortion dis-
closure laws are problematic because they are inconsistent with the doctrine of informed
consent.
7 For a similar argument in an entirely different legal context (civil procedure), see Scott
Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (2011) ("[A]lthough
judges and commentators often invoke jurisdictional clarity and appear committed to it, juris-
dictional doctrine is . .. neither clear nor simple").
[Vol. 21:1
THE ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT DEBATE
against promulgation of "any regulation that ... violates the principles of
informed consent and the ethical standards of health care professionals."8
Overly simplified references to informed consent like this only reinforce
the erroneous assumption that the medical and legal communities agree
on how the physician-patient relationship should be structured.
This Article contends that when viewed as a whole, the doctrine of
informed consent does not impose nearly as significant a barrier to abor-
tion disclosure laws as many critics claim. To cite just a few examples,
even the ethical theory of informed consent recognizes that physicians
may, in some cases, legitimately attempt to persuade their patients to
reach one decision rather than another. As a principle of tort law, moreo-
ver, informed consent inherently takes into account social values when
determining the scope of the information that physicians ought to dis-
close. Finally, the doctrine of informed consent, as a practical matter,
gives physicians broad discretion in determining how to communicate
with their patients. In light of these considerations, perhaps the new
abortion disclosure laws should be viewed not as anomalies, but rather as
explicit manifestations of the sort of value judgments that have long been
implicit in the law and doctrine of informed consent.
To be clear, this Article in no way seeks to defend the recent flood
of politically-motivated amendments to abortion informed consent laws.
It is extremely disconcerting when a state's ideological messages are per-
mitted to overtake the sphere of physician-patient communication. This
is particularly true for both the physician, whose ethical obligation and
legal right to voice medical opinions is at issue, and the patient, whose
right to reproductive choice is implicated. This Article has an intention-
ally narrow focus in that it takes aim solely at the current articulation of
the argument from informed consent in ethical and legal literature.
By emphasizing a more nuanced understanding of the doctrine of
informed consent, this Article aims to defuse and civilize the heated de-
bate that has surrounded this new breed of abortion disclosure require-
ments. While this approach may not allow for sweeping generalizations
about the legitimacy of abortion informed consent laws as a whole, it
will help both proponents and critics of such laws strengthen their argu-
ments to more accurately reflect underlying doctrine. In particular, it
offers critics of abortion disclosure laws the opportunity to bolster their
challenges to some of the most problematic provisions, such as those
requiring disclosure of disputed factual information, those requiring phy-
sician, rather than state, disclosure of non-medically material informa-
tion, and those requiring patients to view information or images against
their will. Perhaps more importantly, the analysis in this Article may
8 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1554, 124
Stat. 119, 259 (2010).
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encourage critics of abortion disclosure laws to shift their focus from
informed consent-based arguments towards potentially more persuasive
arguments grounded in public policy and constitutional theory.
I. ABORTION DISCLOSURE LAWS AND INFORMED CONSENT-
BASED OBJECTIONS
As of this writing, abortion-specific informed consent laws-also
called "Women's Right to Know Laws"-have been passed in over
thirty states. 9 Many more have recently been proposed.' 0 While details
vary, the most controversial provisions relate to required disclosure of
specific risk factors, mandatory ultrasounds, and standardized physician
scripts. This Section briefly describes these and other provisions com-
monly found in abortion disclosure laws as well as the most common
informed consent-based objections thereto.
A. Recent Informed Consent Legislation in the Abortion Context
Informed consent laws targeted specifically at the abortion proce-
dure frequently include some, or all, of the following provisions.
1. Specific Risk Factors
The doctrine of informed consent, as a matter of both medical ethics
and common law, requires that a physician disclose the risks associated
with a given procedure. Many state legislatures have supplemented this
general common law requirement with statutes that require disclosure of
the association between abortion and specific risk factors, including the
risk of psychological problems and suicide," breast cancer,' 2 and harm
to subsequent pregnancies or future infertility.' 3 At least ten states also
9 See Gold & Nash, supra note 3 at 8.
10 See, e.g., Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2010, H.R. 5276, 11Ith Cong. (2010).
See generally infra Section I.A.
11 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.10 (West 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.3
(2004); S. 793, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010). See generally GUTrMACHER INST.,
State Policies in Brief Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion (Aug. 2011), http://www.
guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_.MWPA.pdf ("7 of the 19 states that include information
on possible psychological responses to abortion describe only negative emotional responses.").
12 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (West 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33
(2008); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West 2009); Ind. S.B. 0457 (proposed
Jan. 12, 2011). See generally GUTrMACHER INST., supra note 11 ("6 of the 7 states that in-
clude information on breast cancer inaccurately assert a link between abortion and an in-
creased risk of breast cancer.").
13 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.012 (West 2009); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-33 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.3 (2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 253.10
(West 2009); Mo. S. 793. See generally GIrrTMACHER INST., State Policies in Brief supra
note I1.
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include information about the gestational age at which fetuses may be
able to feel pain. 14
2. Gestational Age and Fetal Development
Most states require, as part of the informed consent process, that the
physician disclose the probable gestational age of her fetus to the woman
seeking an abortion.15 Physicians may also be required to describe or
provide a state brochure describing the stages of fetal development, in-
cluding the anatomical and physiological descriptions of the fetus at each
stage.16 As part of this process, some states provide illustrations, photo-
graphs, or even videos.' 7
3. Ultrasound and Auscultation Requirements
Closely related to laws requiring disclosure of probable gestational
age and fetal characteristics are those that prohibit a physician from pro-
viding an abortion unless she has first performed an ultrasound.18 Some
require that the physician describe or show the ultrasound image to the
14 See, e.g., S. 793, 95th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1104
(2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3 (2000). See generally GurrMACHER INST., supra note 11;
Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference,
and Fetal Pain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111 (2008). In a striking development, a
number of states have recently passed the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which
prohibits abortion after the twentieth or twenty-first week of pregnancy, on the basis of evi-
dence suggesting that fetuses are able to feel pain by that point. See S. 1165, 61st Leg. (Idaho
2011); H.R. 1210, 117th Gen. Assemb. (Ind. 2011) (enacted); H. 2218, Sess. of 2011 (Kan.
2011) (enrolled); Leg. B. 1103, 101st Leg. (Neb. 2010) (enacted); H.R. 1888, 53rd Leg. (Okla.
2011) (enacted).
15 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.012 (West 2009); S. 793, 95th Gen.
Assemb. (Mo. 2010). See generally Blumenthal, supra note 5, at 6 n.29; GuTrrMACHER INST.,
supra note II (identifying 32 states with gestational age disclosure requirements).
16 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 171.016 (West 2009). See generally Blu-
menthal, supra note 5, at 6 n.30.
17 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2006) ("The materials shall include,
for each of the two (2) of four (4) week increments specified in this paragraph, a pictorial or
photographic depiction of the zygote, blastocyte, embryo, or fetus."); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.17015 (2001) (requiring a "medically accurate depiction, illustration, or photo-
graph and description" of the fetus at each stage of development); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
305.5 (West 2008) (requiring that the Department of Health produce an "informational
video"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.027 (2005) ("The physician who is to perform or induce the
abortion ... [must] present[ ] the woman, in person, printed materials provided by the depart-
ment, which describe the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn
child at two-week gestational increments from conception to full term, including color photo-
graphs or images of the developing unborn child at two-week gestational increments.").
18 See, e.g., Az. REV. STAT. § 36-2301.02 (LexisNexis 2000) (found unconstitutional in
Tucson Women's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.2 (2008), S. 528, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010) (enacted); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
02.1-01 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1-738.3d (2004) (temporarily enjoined in July 2010);
H.R. 15, 80th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). In May 2010, the Florida House passed a bill requiring
that women have an ultrasound before getting an abortion; the governor, Charlie Crist, vetoed
the bill. Bill Kaczor, Crist Vetoes Florida Abortion Ultrasound Measure, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
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woman.' 9 For example, an Oklahoma law, which is currently under judi-
cial review, provides that while a patient is permitted to "avert[ ] her
eyes" or "refuse[ ] to look" at the ultrasound images, a medical provider
will be liable for damages if she does not display the images to the pa-
tient.20 Louisiana has a similar provision. 21 Some states also require
physicians to offer women the opportunity for fetal auscultation-that is,
listening to the fetus' heartbeat in utero.22
4. Standardized Language
South Dakota has taken the lead in crafting standardized informed
consent language that physicians must use when consulting with patients
who are seeking abortions. In 2005, legislators in South Dakota passed a
law requiring physicians to make a "biological disclosure" that "the abor-
tion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human
being"; a "relationship disclosure" that "the pregnant woman has an ex-
isting relationship with that unborn human being"; and a "medical risk
disclosure" describing the known medical risks and "statistically signifi-
cant risk factors" of the abortion procedure, including "increased risk of
suicide ideation and suicide," before providing an abortion.23 These dis-
closure requirements were challenged on constitutional grounds, and in
2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota upheld
Jun. 11, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37645422/ns/politics-decision_2010/t/crist-
vetoes-fla-abortion-ultrasound-measure/.
The presumed purpose of these requirements is to allow the physician to determine ap-
proximate fetal age, which may have an impact on the choice of abortion procedures. See
generally Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2010, at Al; American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Medical Man-
agement of Abortion, ACOG PRAc. BULL. 67 (Oct. 2005) (noting that prior to abortion,
"[g]estational age should be confirmed by clinical evaluation or ultrasound" to determine
which abortion procedure is likely to be most effective).
19 See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.027 (2005); S. 793, 95th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2010).
20 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d (2004).
21 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2 (2008); S. 528, Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). Accord-
ing to proponents, "it is strictly optional whether the woman chooses to view the ultrasound, to
hear an explanation or to receive a print." Peter J. Smith, Louisiana Ultrasound Law Chal-
lenged in Federal Court, LiFESiTENEws, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.lifesitenews.com/newsloui
siana-ultrasound-law-challenged-in-federal-court.
22 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.88.027 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04 (2009); S. 793,
95th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (2006); H.R. 15, 80th Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2011) (requiring fetal heart auscultation and simultaneous verbal description thereof). In
support of a similar "heartbeat" bill in Ohio, two fetuses "testified" as their mothers were
scanned by an ultrasound machine before the Ohio legislature. According to media reports,
while one of the fetuses had a clear heartbeat, the other's was "only faintly audible and hard to
distinguish." Aaron Marshall, Ultrasound Images of Two Fetuses Shown to Lawmakers Dur-
ing "Heartbeat Bill" Hearing, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.cleveland.
com/open/index.ssf/2011/03/ultrasound-imagesoftwojfetus.html.
23 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.l(l) (2004).
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only the required biological disclosure.2 4 In its 2011 review of the dis-
trict court's decision, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld the
"relationship disclosure." 25 Other states have followed South Dakota's
lead: North Dakota law requires that a physician tell her patient, at least
twenty-four hours before providing an abortion, that the abortion "will
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being."26 In
2010, Missouri passed a law requiring abortion providers to present pa-
tients with a state brochure that includes the following statement: "The
life of each human being begins at conception. Abortion will terminate
the life of a separate, unique, living human being." 27
5. Information about Abortion Alternatives
Many states require that physicians who counsel women about abor-
tion also describe the various alternatives to abortion-including child-
birth and adoption-and the risks of childbirth and pregnancy.28 Many
states also require physicians to provide contact information for crisis
pregnancy counseling centers that supply women with additional infor-
mation about abortion alternatives. 2 9 Recently, South Dakota became
the first state to pass legislation requiring women to obtain a consultation
at a pregnancy help center before consenting to abortion. 3 0
24 See Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976-77 (D.S.D. 2009) affid
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, --- F.3d ---- , 2011 WL 3862585
(8th Cir. 2011). The South Dakota District Court had initially enjoined enforcement of this
law, finding that the required disclosures violated physicians' First Amendment rights. An en
banc panel of the Eighth Circuit then reversed this decision, remanding the case back to the
district court for further deliberations. Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir.
2008). In August of 2009, the district court reconsidered the case in light of the 8th Circuit's
decision. Although it upheld the biological disclosure, it held that the relationship and medical
risk disclosures were unconstitutional.
25 Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 3862585 (8th Cir. 2011).
26 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2009).
27 Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.027 (2005); S. 793, 95th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2010).
28 See generally Gold & Nash, supra note 3 (discussing state abortion counseling poli-
cies). Another scholar has suggested that, as an extension of this policy, physicians who treat
pregnant women also ensure that their patients fully explore even the presumably uncontrover-
sial decision to continue with a pregnancy (presumably by mentioning abortion as an alterna-
tive). See Sylvia A. Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to
Patients Seeking Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 279, 297 (1994).
29 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §26-23A-4(a) (2002). See generally, Gold & Nash, supra note 3,
at 9, 12.
30 H.J. 1217, 86th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2011) requires that "prior to the day of any scheduled
abortion the pregnant mother must have a consultation at a pregnancy help center at which the
pregnancy help center shall inform her about what education, counseling, and other assistance
is available to help the pregnant mother keep and care for her child, and have a private inter-
view to discuss her circumstances that may subject her decision to coercion," and that the
woman's physician must obtain written confirmation of the woman's consultation prior to
signing the consent for the abortion. On June 30, 2011, the United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota granted a preliminary injunction against the implementation of this
requirement, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of
2011] 9
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6. Information about Social Support Programs
Most states require that physicians who counsel women seeking
abortions provide them with information describing the financial and so-
cial support services available to women with children, including medi-
cal assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and
financial support from the father of the child.3 ' Typically, this informa-
tion appears in a state-sponsored brochure. 32
7. Mandatory Waiting Periods
Finally, many states require a twenty-four-hour waiting period be-
tween the informed consent process and the abortion procedure.33 Re-
cent legislation in South Dakota extends this period to seventy-two
hours.34
B. A Taxonomy of Informed Consent-Based Objections to Abortion
Disclosure Laws
Critics have raised a number of objections to the laws described
above, and among them raised questions concerning neutrality, factual
accuracy, materiality, emotional impact, the likelihood of misleading pa-
tients, and discriminatory assumptions about women. What each of these
criticisms has in common is the overarching concern that abortion disclo-
sure laws are different in kind from traditional informed consent laws-
and, more importantly, that they actually contradict the values underlying
the doctrine of informed consent. This Section provides a taxonomy of
the most common arguments from informed consent, and forms the foun-
dation for the analysis in Section M.
Generally speaking, there are two categories of informed consent-
based objections to abortion disclosure laws. First, many scholars object
to the content of the required disclosures. Abortion disclosure laws may
be objectionable because of the nature of the information communicated;
perhaps some kinds of information simply should not be shared as part of
success on the merits. Planned Parenthood v. Daugaard, --- F. Supp. 2d ---- , 2011 WL
2582731 (D.S.D. 2011).
31 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(2) (West 2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 171.012 (West 2009); see also Gold & Nash, supra note 3, at 9, 12; Dresser, supra
note 3, at 1611.
32 See Gold & Nash, supra note 3 at 9, 12.
33 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-3
(2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (2009); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.725 (West 2006);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17014 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.4242 (2005);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33 (2008); Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.039 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.1-02 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.12 (2004); 18 PA. CONs. STAT. ANN.
§ 3205 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-330 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 76-7-305
(West 2008).
34 H.J. 1217, 86th Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2011).
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the informed consent process.35  The second category of objection to
abortion disclosure laws is independent of the content of the required
disclosure. Critics who take this perspective argue that, regardless of
what information the state is asking the physician to disclose, the mere
fact of state involvement in the informed consent process is somehow
objectionable. 36 Most objections are of the former kind.
1. Bias and Lack of Neutrality
The primary objection that commentators have raised about modem
abortion informed consent laws is that they are biased towards one out-
come. According to critics, proponents of these laws have a pro-life (or
anti-choice) agenda, and support disclosure requirements only because
they are likely to dissuade women from having abortions.3 7 With respect
to mandatory ultrasound requirements, for example, Carol Sanger writes,
35 For content-based arguments, it may be irrelevant from the patient's perspective
whether the physician chooses to communicate the information due to his own personal be-
liefs, or whether he is forced to communicate this information by state law.
36 Just as the standard of care by which physicians are judged is usually defined by
professional custom rather than legislative fiat, critics say the process of informed consent
should also be left to medical discretion.
37 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 5, at 22 ("There is little question that the goal of
many of these informed consent laws is dissuading women from pursuing abortions[.]");
Dresser, supra note 3, at 1616 ("with abortion, informed consent has been transformed from a
doctrine designed to promote freedom of choice and individual control over one's body to a
tool for inducing women to make the choice that the legislature believes would be morally
appropriate."); Manian, supra note 3, at 237 ("Consent to medical treatment means more than
mere consent to bodily contact; it means respect for patient capacity for self-determination
given accurate, unbiased information."); Richardson & Nash, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that
abortion disclosure requirements are often "patently inaccurate or incomplete, lending
credence to the charge that states' abortion counseling mandates are sometimes intended less
to inform women about the abortion procedure than to discourage them from seeking abortions
altogether."); Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abor-
tion Wars, 118 YALE L. REV. 1318, 1341 (2009) ("[M]andatory ultrasound laws seek to 'per-
sonify the fetus' and, in so doing, 'dissuade the woman from obtaining an abortion."'); Reva
Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Quality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Re-
strictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, at 1023-29 (2007); Tobin, supra note 14, at 148 (sug-
gesting that the legislative history of fetal pain disclosure laws suggests that their aim is to
"shock women choosing abortion into abandoning that choice"); Arthur Caplan, Calling Out
All The Hypocrisies, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 6, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-09-06/
news/0909050207 1 -abortion-doctors-obama-plan ("It is very clear that the point of [the
Oklahoma ultrasound requirement] and similar laws is to discourage women from having abor-
tions. By showing a woman a picture of her fetus and making her listen to a description of
what she is looking at, those who oppose abortion hope to discourage women from choosing
abortion by making them identify with the fetus they are carrying.").
Some proponents of abortion informed consent law, of course, reject these descriptions.
They deny that there is any bias or intent to steer women away from abortion, and focus on the
benefits of information to the woman's autonomous decision-making, regardless of what
choice she makes. Others acknowledge that their goal is to dissuade women from having
abortions; however, they claim that whatever bias exists is necessary to balance out pre-ex-
isting pro-abortion bias. See, e.g., Daniel Avila, The Right to Choose, Neutrality, and Abortion
Consent in Massachusetts, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 511 (2004).
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"[t]he core and motivating belief is that a woman who sees her baby's
image on a screen will be less likely to abort."38 Another example of
bias is the disclosure of risk factors associated with abortion without par-
allel disclosure of the risk factors associated with childbirth-the natural
alternative to abortion.
Such bias is problematic, according to commentators, because both
the ethical and legal doctrines of informed consent demand neutrality in
the disclosure process.39 The goal of informed consent is to strengthen
patient autonomy, and critics of these laws argue that it is impossible to
foster autonomy when the information is presented to the patient in a
non-neutral way.40 If a state or a physician is presenting accurate but
biased information, with the intention of persuading the patient to choose
one outcome over another, then arguably her decision-making process is
not autonomous.
2. Factual Accuracy
Objections about factual accuracy arise in the context of state-man-
dated disclosure of risk factors supposedly associated with abortion, like
the risk of breast cancer, infertility, and suicide as well as disclosure of
factual information about the fetus' capacity to feel pain. Many re-
searchers and even some courts4 1 assert that such disclosures are simply
incorrect-that there is, in fact, no statistically significant correlation be-
tween abortion and the various risk factors identified by statute.42
38 Sanger, supra note 3, at 397 ("[U]ltrasound images of one's own fetus are not in-
tended as neutral information. State legislatures are in agreement on this point; this is why the
statutes are enacted.").
39 See, e.g., Richardson & Nash, supra note 3 ("Informed consent [is] the concept that
individuals have a right to receive relevant, accurate, and unbiased information prior to receiv-
ing medical care so they can make sound decisions regarding treatment[.]"); see also Dresser,
supra note 3, at 1620 (noting that the accepted model of medical decision-making asks for a
"straightforward and dispassionate description" of the intervention). It is worth noting that
even the legal doctrine of informed consent has historically recognized the value and necessity
of neutrality. It was not until the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Casey that American law
made accommodations-in the abortion context only-for states to voice their value judg-
ments about medical procedures. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992). See also Dresser, supra note 3, at 1615 ("The Supreme Court now accepts disclosure
laws as a legitimate means of discouraging abortion[.]").
40 Manian, supra note 3, at 251 (arguing that allowing physicians to disclose biased
information contradicts the purposes of informed consent).
41 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, --- F.3d ---- , 2011 WL 3862585 (8th Cir.
2011) (holding that requiring doctors to describe "all known medical risks" of abortion, includ-
ing "increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide," was unconstitutional).
42 See, e.g., L.L. Bartholomew & D.A. Grimes, Focus on Primary Care: The Alleged
Association Between Induced Abortion and Risk of Breast Cancer: Biology or Bias?, 53 OB-
STETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 708 (1998) (concluding that there is fair evidence that
abortion does not increase the risk of breast cancer); Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A System-
atic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 947 (2005) (conclud-
ing that fetal perception of pain is "unlikely" before the third trimester); Trine Munk-Olsen et
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Factual accuracy is of paramount importance to both ethical and
legal theories of informed consent. The purpose of informed consent is
to provide patients with information that is relevant to their medical deci-
sion-making; it goes without saying that this information must be accu-
rate in order to be valuable to patients. No reputable modem practitioner
would condone the use of misinformation to persuade a patient to reach
the "correct" decision. Even the Supreme Court's 1992 Casey opinion,
arguably the single greatest recent expansion of the legal doctrine of in-
formed consent,4 3 insisted that the information provided in the informed
consent process be "truthful and not misleading."4"
3. Materiality and Medical Relevance
Many disclosures required by modem abortion informed consent
statutes are challenged on the grounds that they are immaterial to a rea-
sonable patient's decision or that they lack medical relevance. 4 5 Materi-
ality challenges have been made against requirements that physicians
display and describe ultrasound images to a woman seeking an abor-
tion, 4 6 that they provide her with information about the characteristics of
a fetus at various stages of development, and that they use standardized
al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 332
(2011) (finding that the prevalence of mental health problems increases after childbirth, but not
after abortion); G. E. Robinson et al., Is There An "Abortion Trauma Syndrome"? Critiquing
the Evidence, 17 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 268 (2009) (finding methodological problems
among empirical studies drawing a connection between abortion and later psychological
trauma); see also Katherine DeLellis Henderson et al., Incomplete Pregnancy is Not Associ-
ated with Breast Cancer Risk: The California Teachers Study, 77 CONTRACEPTION 391 (2008);
Gillian K. Reeves et al., Breast Cancer Risk in Relation to Abortion: Results from the EPC
study, 119 INTERNAL J. CANCER 1741-45 (2006); Tobin, supra note 14, at 143-48 (relating to
fetal pain provisions); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Induced Abor-
tion and Breast Cancer Risk, ACOG COMM. Op. No. 434 (June 2009) (noting that early stud-
ies had "significant methodological problems," and concluding that "there is no association
between induced abortion and breast cancer").
43 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 8
(Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Empirical Studies Ctr., Paper No. 9, 2010), available at http://law.
bepress.com/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article= I119&context=UMichlwps.
44 Casey, 505 U.S at 885-87. But see Eubanks v. Schmidt, in which a Kentucky court
interpreted Casey's "truthful and not misleading" requirement to mean only that "the pam-
phlets themselves" meet that requirement, and not that "every statement made by every agency
identified [in the pamphlet] be truthful and nonmisleading." 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459 (W.D.
Ky. 2000).
45 See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 3, at 1604; see also Allyson M. Rucinski, Finding the
Middle Ground: Acuna v. Turkish and the New Jersey Supreme Court's Reaffirmation of a
Doctor's Role Under the Doctrine of Informed Consent in the Digital Age, 29 PACE L. REv.
797 (2009) (arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court in Acuna took the right approach by
looking to medical materiality).
46 See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 3, at 400-01 (describing an ultrasound scan as not "just
information.").
132011]
14 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
language describing the moral status of the fetus.4 7 One might also raise
materiality objections against mandatory disclosures of information
about financial and social resources available to women who choose to
continue with the pregnancy.
Materiality objections come in two forms. The first form argues
that the information required by abortion disclosure statutes is not mate-
rial to a reasonable patient's medical decision. For example, critics ar-
gue that, in deciding whether to have an abortion or to continue with her
pregnancy, a pregnant woman is not likely to consider a visual depiction
of her fetus as relevant to her decision-making process.4 8 The patient-
based materiality objection is grounded, once again, in the ethical princi-
ple that informed consent should facilitate a patient's autonomous deci-
sion-making. If a patient does not consider a piece of information
material or relevant to her decision, her physician has no ethical obliga-
tion to disclose it. The problem, of course, with the patient-specific stan-
dard of disclosure, which medical ethics may require, is that it is very
difficult to implement in practice. Most modem physicians do not have
enduring relationships with their patients such that they can know what
information is relevant to any particular patient; moreover, the modem
medical system does not facilitate or reimburse such discussions with
new patients. It is for reasons of administrative efficiency like this that
courts, as a legal matter, uniformly reject the subjective patient standard.
To the extent that tort law considers patient preference as relevant to the
content of medical disclosure, it looks to the needs and expectations of a
reasonable patient. Physicians are not held liable for failing to disclose
information that a reasonable patient would not consider relevant, even if
the unique patient bringing the lawsuit has atypical preferences.
The second form of materiality objection asserts that disclosure of
ultrasound images, standardized language, financial information, and the
like are not necessary because physicians are only required to disclose
medically material information during the informed consent process.
The physician is an expert in medical care and is expected to provide
accurate information about the nature of a procedure, its risks, and its
47 See, e.g., Lazzarini, supra note 5 (arguing that new abortion informed consent require-
ments should be problematic to physicians because they require the disclosure of ideological
information); see also Rucinski, supra note 45 ("[S]ome states have taken it upon themselves
to over-legislate in the area of abortion by requiring doctors to make excessive disclosures that
are arguably moral, philosophical, or religious in nature.").
48 To a certain extent these are empirical questions. Challengers of informed consent
laws have supported their claims by emphasizing the paucity of lawsuits brought by women
claiming their physicians failed to provide them with adequate information before they chose
to have an abortion. See, e.g., Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-
Abortion Psychological Trauma, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 639, 641 (1995); but see Acuna v.
Turkish, 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007). One conclusion, however, may be not that these lawsuits
are rare, but rather that these suits are rarely successful.
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alternatives. But there are many other factors, perhaps relevant to some
patients, that physicians need not disclose, either legally or ethically,
simply because it is outside the scope of their expertise. 49 A reasonable
patient deciding between two treatments would surely want to know
what his insurance company's rate of reimbursement is for each treat-
ment, but we do not require physicians to disclose this information be-
cause it is outside the scope of medical relevance. In deciding among
procedures, a patient might reasonably consider whether one procedure
carries a social stigia; but again, this is not within the physician's area
of expertise. Likewise, the fact that social services are available to sup-
port single mothers is surely relevant to a woman's abortion decision, but
it may not be within the scope of a reasonable physician's knowledge.5 0
4. Value Judgments Masquerading as Facts
Concerns about physician scripts and standardized language are re-
lated to the materiality concerns described above. According to critics,
when a patient's doctor tells her that abortion ends the life of a "whole,
separate, unique, living human being," the patient is likely to be misled
into thinking that this is a statement of medical fact, rather than of val-
ues.5 1 At least one court has supported this view. 52
While proponents of such disclosures note that they are scientifi-
cally accurate-since a fetus is a developing member of the species
Homo sapiens, it is a "human being"53-critics point out that the term
"human being" is loaded with ideological implications. 5 4 The average
patient hearing the phrase "human being" is more likely to understand it
from a common-sense perspective that incorporates judgments about
moral worth, rather than a scientific perspective that describes the genus
49 See Law, supra note 28, at 302.
50 But see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992) (noting
that because health risks include risks to "psychological well-being," disclosures about the
consequences of abortion on the fetus are relevant, "even when those consequences have no
direct relation to her health," in much the same way that disclosures of the consequences to a
kidney donor may be relevant to the recipient).
51 See, e.g., Lauren R. Robbins, Open Your Mouth and Say Ideology: Physicians and the
First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 181 (2009); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
939, 959 (2007).
52 See Acuna, 930 A.2d at 425-26 (holding that physicians have no common law duty to
make such a disclosure, because there is no consensus in the medical community supporting
the position that an embryo "is, as a matter of biological fact-as opposed to a moral, theologi-
cal, or philosophical judgment-'a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable human being'
or that terminating an early pregnancy involves 'actually killing an existing human being'").
53 See id at 425-26.
54 As Judith Jarvis Thomson noted in her paradigmatic essay, "[a] newly fertilized
ovum ... is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree." Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense
of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48 (1971).
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and species.55 Robert Post, for example, poses a hypothetical where a
state legislature defines the word "soul" in an abortion informed-consent
statute to mean "DNA."56 Even though the legislative definition refers to
a scientifically accurate concept, the average patient hearing the word
"soul" is likely to interpret it in normative or ideological terms.5 7
The problem with such disclosure requirements, many argue, is that
they blur the boundary between medical information and ideological in-
formation. The ethical and legal doctrine of informed consent requires
disclosure of material, accurate, non-obvious information needed by pa-
tients to make an informed medical decision. When a term like "human
being" is "lifted from its glossary context and placed into the mouth of
the physician, it loses its supposedly scientific couching" and becomes
manipulative.58 Instead, critics suggest that if the state wishes to convey
a moral, philosophical, or ideological message about the status of the
fetus, it ought to do so directly, rather than shielding itself behind the
"borrowed authority" of the medical profession. 59 An approach that fa-
vors direct state speech, rather than state-mandated physician disclosure,
is less likely to mislead patients about scientific facts and is less likely to
impact negatively the relationship of trust between doctors and
patients. 60
5. Emotional Impact and Fear Appeals
Many critics object to disclosures such as ultrasound visuals, fetal
heartbeats, images of fetuses at various states of development, and infor-
mation about fetal pain on the grounds that these types of disclosures are
emotionally charged and likely to trigger negative emotional reactions in
patients. 61 In his concurrence in Casey, Justice Blackmun analogized
55 See, e.g., Lazzarini, supra note 5, at 2189; Post, supra note 51, at 959 ("From a bio-
logical perspective, a nonviable fetus is neither 'whole' nor 'separate,' because it cannot sur-
vive outside its relationship with its mother."); Robbins, supra note 51, at 162.
56 Post, supra note 51, at 959. Moreover, as Post notes, informed consent statutes that
require statements to the effect that the fetus is a human being require that physicians disclose
"obvious" information, which they are under no legal obligation to do. Id. at 954.
57 Id. Robbins, supra note 51, at 162.
58 Post, supra note 51, at 954; see also Lazzarini, supra note 5, at 2189 (same); Rucinski,
supra note 45 (same).
59 Caitlin E. Borgmann, Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Sci-
ence in the Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & Pot'Y 15, 15-16 (2008); Rucinski, supra note 45;
Reva B. Seigel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/
Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1760 (2008); see also Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983).
60 See generally Post, supra note 51, at 940 ("[T]here is a First Amendment interest in
protecting the integrity of physician patient communications as a channel for the communica-
tion of accurate medical information.").
61 See, e.g., Blumenthal, supra note 5, at 4-5, 23, 25-26; Sanger, supra note 3, at 378
("Although couched in the protective terms of informed consent, these statutes are un-
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such requirements to requiring "a visual preview of an operation to re-
move an appendix," which he argued "plays no part in a physician's
securing informed consent to an appendectomy," and "does not construc-
tively inform" medical decision-making. 62 Critics argue that sharing
sensitive visual information with a woman seeking an abortion preys on
her emotional vulnerabilities, triggering her to make a decision on the
basis of emotion, rather than reason. 63
These disclosures are arguably problematic because, although the
ethical doctrine of informed consent recognizes that persuasion may be
appropriate in some circumstances, it demands that attempts at persua-
sion be accomplished through rational reasoning.64 If, instead, a physi-
cian provides emotionally charged information that overwhelms the
patient and preys on her fears, it is a form of arational persuasion and
therefore presumptively impermissible. 6 5 Such appeals to fear not only
lead to poor decisions, 66 but also may constitute harassment. 6 7
6. Negative and Discriminatory Assumptions about Women
A final argument against abortion informed consent statutes-and
one of the few arguments that is content-neutral in nature-is that the
mere existence of informed consent laws for abortion reflects offensive
and antiquated views about women. Critics have pointed out that abor-
tion is one of very few medical procedures where there is legislation
setting out the limits of disclosure in a way that goes beyond common
law requirements. 68 The fact that legislative disclosure requirements ex-
ist for abortion, but not for other procedures, they argue, entrenches the
abashedly meant to transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of
the potentially aborting mother.").
62 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 936 n.7 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
63 Sanger, supra note 3, at 396-97 ("It [the ultrasound requirement] is less an appeal to
reason than an attempt to overpower it"); Blumenthal, supra note 5, at 4-5, 23, 25-26 (arguing
that even truthful and non-misleading information may restrict a woman's autonomy by prey-
ing on her emotional vulnerabilities).
64 See Tom BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETmIcs
133-35 (4th ed. 2009); see also RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY
OF INFORMED CONSENT 347-52 (1986).
65 See Dresser, supra note 3, at 1619-21 ("[unformed consent doctrine has never been
cited to support a law prohibiting medically accepted procedure simply because patients may
become upset upon hearing what this procedure involves or because they might later regret
undergoing it.").
66 See Blumenthal, supra note 5, at 25-26; see also Sanger, supra note 3, at 397.
67 See Sanger, supra note 3, at 400 (stating that an ultrasound "is less like a brochure
than it is like a sidewalk abortion protestor," and is thus harassment masquerading as
knowledge).
68 See Dresser, supra note 3, at 1602.
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idea of female incompetence in medical decision-making. 69 According
to Reva Siegel, for example, the selective and procedure-specific way in
which the state has interfered with physician discretion is grounded in
the ingrained belief that women's medical decision-making in the abor-
tion context is "coerced or confused" and that women are unable to make
rational informed consent decisions without state guidance. 70 If this is
the case, then abortion informed consent statutes are problematic from an
ethical and policy perspective because they treat female decision-making
differently from male decision-making, thus violating the principle that
men and women are equally capable of autonomous choice.
II. INFORMED CONSENT AS A SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED DOCTRINE
Many of the objections highlighted in Section I.B depend on a con-
ception of informed consent that is fact-based and value-neutral. For the
most part, legal and ethical theorists-as well as judges and legislators-
tend to view the informed consent process as one grounded in objectivity
and impartiality. 7 ' Indeed, there is a sense of certainty even in the stan-
dard litany of informed consent disclosure requirements-"the nature of
the intervention, its risks and benefits, as well as of alternatives with their
risks and benefits"72-almost as if the content of the required disclosures
were etched in stone for each procedure.
Nonetheless, with greater reflection on this vision of informed con-
sent, the less accurate it seems. Certainly, legal norms of informed con-
69 See Siegel, supra note 59, at 1726; see also Lazzarini, supra note 5, at 2191. Bonnie
Adams Kapp, executive director of the New Morning Foundation in Columbia, South Caro-
lina, describes the arguments made by proponents of abortion waiting periods as "insulting."
She says, "What is implied, when you think about the statements deeper, is that a woman is
casual about the decision to have an abortion." Dudley Brown, Sanford Signs Abortion Delay
Bill, Gives Pro-Lifers a Win, GoUPSTATE, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.goupstate.com/article/
20100819/ARTICLES/8191033?p=1 &tc=PG.
Proponents, of course, suggest that mandatory waiting periods are necessary to ensure
that women seeking abortions have the time to come to a well-reasoned decision. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 885-87 (1992) (upholding a twenty-four
hour waiting period as constitutional, noting that "[t]he idea that important decisions will be
more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as
unreasonable."). But see Planned Parenthood of Del. v. Brady, 250 F. Supp. 2d 405 (D. Del.
2003) (holding Delaware statute imposing a 24-hour waiting period unconstitutional).
70 Siegel, supra note 59, at 1726, 1730; see also Lazzarini, supra note 5, at 2191 (These
statutes "assume[ ] that women are incapable of making decisions about abortion as competent
adults[J"); Manian, supra note 3, at 255 (describing the Carhart opinion as treating women as
less "trustworthy" decision-makers).
71 See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 3, at 1620 (describing the accepted model of medical
decision-making as requiring "[aiccording to [the accepted medical decisionmaking] model,
[that] people are entitled to make choices about medical interventions after being given a
straightforward and dispassionate description of the relevant intervention, its risks and poten-
tial benefits, and available alternatives[.]").
72 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 64, at 283.
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sent often deviate from moral norms; perhaps this is to be expected. But
even the normative view of informed consent as an ethical ideal recog-
nizes that neutrality, objectivity, and impartiality are often impossible,
and sometimes unwarranted. This Section looks to ethics, law, psychol-
ogy, and medical practice to highlight the various ways in which in-
formed consent is a socially constructed doctrine, dependent on value
judgments and social norms, and may be fundamentally incompatible
with the idealized vision of many academics and judges.73
A. What Information is Disclosed?
A physician seeking his patient's consent to a medical intervention
is morally and legally obligated to explain to his patient the information
she needs to know to make an informed decision about how to proceed. 74
Information relevant to this decision-making process includes the nature
of the procedure or intervention, its likelihood of success, its material
risks, any alternatives-including their likelihood of success and their
risks-and the consequences of doing nothing as an option.75 Depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, the standard for the physician's disclosure obliga-
tion under the law may be that of a "reasonable physician" or
"reasonable patient": the physician would be liable in tort law if, under
the reasonable physician standard, she failed to disclose the information
her colleagues customarily disclose, or, under the reasonable patient
standard, she failed to provide the information a reasonable patient
would deem material. 76 Physicians generally have no duty to disclose
information that would be obvious to the average patient.77
Nevertheless, both the ethical standard of informed consent, which
looks to materiality of the information to the patient's decision, and the
legal standard, which looks to the standard of a reasonable patient or
physician, necessarily are dependent on social norms and values.78
There is no fixed answer to the question of what risks any given patient
73 There is a wide body of literature relating to the so-called "informed consent gap," that
is, the gap between informed consent in theory and in practice. See generally Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994).
74 See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 64, at 120-24.
75 See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 644, at 283; see also Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that informed consent entails an opportu-
nity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and risks attendant thereto).
76 See, e.g., Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 209-12 (1988) (discussing both standards
and electing to follow the reasonable patient rule).
77 See Post, supra note 51, at 954. However, some research suggests that many common
presumptions about patient health literacy (including what information is known or "obvious"
to patients) are incorrect. See generally Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a Silent Epidemic:
The Role of Health Literacy in Health Care Access, Quality, and Cost (unpublished draft on
file with author).
78 The choice between the reasonable patient standard and the reasonable physician stan-
dard also clearly implicates social values.
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would deem material; it will depend both on the patient herself and the
attitudes of the community regarding the nature and probability of vari-
ous risks.79 Consider, for example, a medical intervention for glaucoma
that, if effective, poses a twenty-five percent chance of causing complete
blindness, and a twenty-five percent chance of causing a change in the
person's eye color, however improbable. Would either or both of these
risks be material to the average patient? Although a patient would pre-
sumably want to know of the possibility of a change in eye color, it is
unlikely that the average patient would consider this information material
enough to cause him to rethink his decision.80 Faced with the choice of
glaucoma or a successful treatment that causes a change in eye color, it is
difficult to imagine a reasonable patient opting against treatment. Imag-
ine instead that this decision were taking place in a discriminatory soci-
ety with a caste system based on eye color, where people with blue eyes
are routinely discriminated against. In such a context, surely the risk of a
change in eye color would be relevant to a reasonable person's decision.
This example demonstrates that societal values are necessarily tied to the
determination of what information must be disclosed during the informed
consent process.
For a more realistic example, consider whether a physician or re-
searcher has a legal or ethical obligation to disclose a financial conflict of
interest to his patients or research subjects.8 While at least one court has
found that a patient may have a cause of action against a physician who
fails to disclose any financial interest she may have in the procedure she
is performing on the patient,8 2 there is no clear legal or ethical consensus
on the scope of required disclosures.83 Similarly, it is unclear whether a
physician's personal characteristics-HIV status, religion, gender, drug
use-are or should be material to patients when making medical deci-
79 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 73, at 912. Schuck describes assumption of risk in the
informed consent context as a factual question for the jury, "shaped by evolving social norms."
Implied assumption of risk, "notwithstanding its ostensible and legally institutionalized char-
acter as "fact," is in reality a culturally constructed and highly normative doctrine[.]" Id.
80 For a patient to prevail in an informed consent suit, she must show that the failure of
informed consent caused her injury-in other words, that a reasonable patient would have
chosen not to undergo the procedure had she been informed of the relevant facts. See infra
note 85.
81 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); see also
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Estate of Gelsinger v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania:
Money, Prestige, and Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research, in HEALTH LAW AND
BioETHics: CASES IN CONTEXT (Sandra Johnson et al. eds., 2009).
82 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
83 See e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical
Frontier, 27 Am. J.L. & MED. 149, 158-59 (2001); see also BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1607 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing varying federal
thresholds for conflict of interest disclosures in research).
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sions.8 4 Whether a physician chooses to disclose this information will
ultimately depend on both her own understanding of her ethical obliga-
tions and on the legal precedent in her jurisdiction. Likewise, when it
comes to ultrasound images, descriptions of fetal development, standard-
ized language, and information about social support systems for women
seeking abortions, the legal and ethical requirements under the doctrine
of informed consent will also depend on social norms and patient
expectations.85
Beyond the value judgments inherent in the decision of what infor-
mation must be disclosed, there is a secondary question of whether phy-
sicians may legitimately communicate ideological or value-based
information to their patients during the course of the informed consent
process. Perhaps surprisingly, even some of the same scholars who chal-
lenge abortion disclosure laws recognize that such value-laden informa-
tion may be a legitimate part of the informed consent process. Howard
Minkoff and Mary Faith Marshall, for example, note that simply because
a physician's disclosure script is "value-laden," it "is not necessarily in-
compatible with the ethics of counseling."86 Rather, they clarify that
only certain kinds of values-those relevant to the physician or to the
patient-are appropriate during the informed consent communication.87
Indeed, in another hotly disputed bioethical context, that of physicians
with conscientious objections to certain medical procedures, some com-
mentators recommend that physicians explain their medical decisions by
reference to their own moral obligations.88 Moreover, PPACA, which
funds programs to improve shared decision-making,89 recognizes that
some medical decisions cannot be resolved on the basis of facts alone.
"Preference sensitive care," for example, is defined by PPACA as "medi-
cal care for which the clinical evidence does not clearly support one
84 See generally Laurel R. Hanson, Informed Consent and the Scope of a Physician's
Duty to Disclose, 77 N.D. L. REV. 71 (2001) (discussing the lack of clear standards regarding
what personal information a physician must disclose to patients).
85 Tort law, of course, addresses this area of uncertainty by relying on the reasonable
person standard. Rather than enumerate exactly what information physicians are required to
disclose during the informed consent process, American tort law relies on a model of reasona-
bleness and injury. In order for a plaintiff to recover in an informed consent claim, he must
demonstrate, first, that the physician's disclosure fell short of the standard of reasonableness,
and second, that the physician's breach actually caused the injury. In other words, the plaintiff
would have chosen another option had he been provided with the missing information. By
requiring proof of both reasonableness and injury, tort law ensures that recovery is based on
individual harm while at the same time taking into account norms of medical decision-making.
86 Minkoff & Marshall, supra note 3, at 22.
87 See id.
88 See, e.g., Law, supra note 28 at 304 (quoting Billy E. Moore, an attorney who repre-
sents physicians who are Jehovah's Witnesses, as saying "Of course the doctor needs to ex-
plain his beliefs to [his] patients.").
89 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3506, 124
Stat. 119, 527 (2010).
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treatment option such that the appropriate course of treatment depends on
the values of the patient." 90
Thus, the argument that value judgments have no place whatsoever
in informed consent cannot stand. A better approach is the one Minkoff
and Marshall take, suggesting that that only patient and physician value
judgments-not those of the state-are relevant to informed consent. As
further discussed in Section HlI.C, 91 the principle of medical materiality
supports the argument that the value judgments expressed during the in-
formed consent encounter ought to be limited to those of the patient, and,
if necessary, the physician. Conversely, non-medical facts and values
that may be deemed relevant by the state have no place in the informed
consent discussion.
B. How is the Information Disclosed?
Even if there were a value-neutral way of determining what catego-
ries of information physicians are ethically and legally obligated to dis-
close, the process of disclosure itself is far from objective. And
unfortunately, neither the ethical nor the legal doctrines of informed con-
sent offer much guidance in this regard.
Psychology and communications research consistently demonstrate
that the language used to disclose information affects people's under-
standing, retention, and decision-making. Framing effects, in particular,
have a significant impact on patient choices. 92 Changes in levels of med-
ical risk can be framed in either absolute or relative terms,93 and a pa-
90 Id. at § 3506(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 527. In fact, the Act specifically precludes the re-
search from these programs to affect coverage or reimbursement decisions "with the intent to
discourage an individual from choosing a health care treatment based on how the individual
values the tradeoff between extending the length of their life and the risk of disability." Id. at
§ 1182(d)(1), 124 Stat. at 740. See also Annette O'Connor et al., Modifying Unwarranted
Variations in Health Care: Shared Decision Making Using Patient Decision Aids, HEALTH
AFFAIRS var-63, Oct. 7, 2004, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/10/07/hlthaff.
var.63 (identifying "preference-sensitive" care as care where "the best choice depends on pa-
tients' values or preferences for the benefits, harms, and scientific uncertainties of each
option.").
91 See infra Section III.C (arguing that non-medical information, such as statements of
moral values, that are deemed relevant by the state ought to be communicated directly by the
state, rather than by the physician); Section III.D (suggesting that while patients do make
decisions based on emotional judgments, it may not be appropriate for third parties to take
advantage of these emotions).
92 See, e.g., Adrian Edwards et al., Presenting Risk Information a Review of the Effects of
"Framing" and Other Manipulations on Patient Outcomes, 6 J. HEALTH COMM.: INT'L PERSP.
61 (2001) [hereinafter: Presenting Risk Information]; A. Edwards & G. Elwyn, Understanding
Risk and Lessons for Clinical Risk Communication About Treatment Preferences, 10 QuAL.
HEALTH CARE i9, ill (2001).
93 Reducing a risk from 20% to 15% is a 5% absolute reduction in risk. In contrast,
reducing a risk from 20% to 15% means that the risk is 20% less likely to occur in relative
terms. Most proponents of health literacy recommend the disclosure of risks in absolute,
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tient's judgment may change based on which terms are used. Similarly,
presenting a patient with an 85% chance of survival may cause the pa-
tient to make a different decision than presenting him with a 15% chance
of death.
Scholars who challenge the validity of theoretical models of in-
formed consent often note that there is little evidence to support the idea
that these models actually are effective in communicating information.94
Much discussion in modern medical practice has been devoted to the
question of how information can be communicated to patients most ef-
fectively,95 but the ethical theory of informed consent neither defines
effectiveness nor offers suggestions as to how to achieve it. To the ex-
tent that researchers do study the effectiveness of informed consent, they
typically gauge it by the patient's ability to recall, understand, and "teach
back" what the physician has explained. 96 These studies only test pa-
tients' ability to recall the information that medical providers have told
them; they do not test the accuracy or validity of the underlying informa-
tion itself.
For an example of disclosure variations in the abortion context, con-
sider the Texas Department of Health's informational pamphlet, A Wo-
man's Right to Know, which Texas physicians are required by law to
make available to women seeking abortion. 97 This brochure is purport-
edly neutral in that it describes the risks associated with abortion as well
as the risks associated with pregnancy. However, a review of the lan-
guage used in the document clearly reveals the state's preference. Under
the heading "Abortion Risks," patients are informed that:
rather than relative terms, as patients are less likely to misunderstand absolute values. See
Presenting Risk Information, supra note 92, at 74.
94 See generally Schuck, supra note 73.
95 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, for example, addresses this question
by promoting the use of patient decision aids, defined as "educational tool[s] that help[] pa-
tients, caregivers or authorized representatives understand and communicate their beliefs and
preferences related to their treatment options, and to decide with their health care provider
what treatments are best for them based on their treatment options, scientific evidence, circum-
stances, beliefs, and preferences." Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 3506(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 527
(2010). See also Isaac M. Lipkus, Numeric, Verbal, and Visual Formats of Conveying Health
Risks: Suggested Best Practices and Future Recommendations, 27 MED. DECISION MAKING
696 (2007).
96 HELEN W. WU ET AL., NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY THROUGH
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PATIENTS WITH LIMITED HEALTH LITERACY: AN IMPLEMENTATION RE-
PORT 3 (2005), http://www.qualityforum.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?Linkldentifier-ID&Item
ID=22090. Thanks to LLM student Jayne Westendorp Holland for connecting me with this
research.
97 PROTECT TEXAS, A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNow 10 (Texas Dep't of Health ed., 2003),
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf.
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The risks are fewer when an abortion is done in the
early weeks of pregnancy. The further along in the
pregnancy, the greater chance of serious complications
and the greater the risk of dying from the abortion pro-
cedure. For example:
* One death per every 530,000 abortions if you are
at eight weeks or less.
* One death per every 17,000 abortions for
pregnancies 16-20 weeks.
* One death per'6,000 abortions at 21 weeks or
more.98
The brochure also lists a number of factors that "affect the possibil-
ity of complications," including the physician's skill, the type of anesthe-
sia, the patient's health, and the type of abortion procedure used.99
Compare this with the language used under the heading "Pregnancy
and Childbirth":100
Pregnancy and childbirth is usually a safe, natural pro-
cess although complications can occur. The most com-
mon complications of pregnancy include:
* Ectopic pregnancy
* High blood pressure
* Complicated delivery
* Premature labor
* Depression
* Infection
* Diabetes
* Hemorrhage (heavy bleeding)
* One out of 8,475 women dies from pregnancy
complications. 10
Pregnancy, although carrying a 1 in 8,475 risk of death, 102 is de-
scribed as "usually a safe, natural process." In contrast, abortion, which
98 Id. Note that the information provided in the Texas brochure identifies significantly
higher levels of risk than the information collected by the Guttmacher Institute, which collects
reliable and nonpartisan research relating to sexual activity and reproductive health. See Fre-
quently Asked Questions, GuTrMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/about/faq.html (last
visited Aug. 27, 2011). The Guttmacher Institute reports that the risk of death is approxi-
mately 1 in one million before eight weeks, 1/29,000 at 16-20 weeks, and 1/11,000 at 21
weeks or later. GurrrMACHER INST., Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States (Jan.
2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb-induced-abortion.html [hereinafter
Facts on Induced Abortion].
99 PROTECT TEXAS, supra note 97, at 12.
1oo Id. at 19.
101 Id.
102 Note that the Texas brochure provides a much more precise figure for pregnancy risk
[Vol. 21:1
THE ABORTION INFORMED CONSENT DEBATE
poses significantly less risk of death in 98.5% of cases, 03 is described
primarily in terms of its risks of death and potential complications. This
approach communicates information in a very different way than if the
risks of death had simply been listed and compared between abortion and
pregnancy.
Of course, this is not to say that simply listing comparative risk
statistics is the better approach. Indeed, some practitioners and policy-
makers suggest that using qualitative terms such as "often" and "rarely"
may in some cases be more effective in communicating risk than focus-
ing on quantitative data.104 In practice, physicians are constantly striving
to improve methods of communication and retention. The conclusions
here are merely that it is difficult, without empirical evidence, to con-
clude that one way of communicating information is more correct or
more accurate than another, and that the theory of informed consent
gives physicians little guidance about which approach to take. 0 5
C. What are the Motives of the Discloser?
While critics of abortion disclosure statutes tend to view the ideal
informed consent process as neutral and unbiased, it is not clear that the
doctrine of informed consent always demands neutrality. Even the most
stringent defenders of informed consent will acknowledge that physi-
cians are permitted not only to make recommendations to patients, but
also to influence patients to follow their recommendations. While the
boundaries of such influence are not clear, one obvious limitation is that
the physician's influence may not extend so far as to negate the volunta-
riness of the patient's decision. 0 6
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, leading theorists in medical
ethics, distinguish between two categories of influence that are relevant
(1 in 8,475), as compared to the figures for abortion risk (which are all rounded to the nearest
thousand). This difference in representation of the facts may also contribute to a reader's
conclusion that the risks of abortion are greater.
103 Only approximately 1.5% of abortions take place at twenty-one weeks or later, the
period during which, according to the Texas brochure, abortion poses a slightly greater risk of
death than childbirth. Facts on Induced Abortion, supra note 98.
104 See, e.g., Adrian Edwards et al., General Practice Registrar Responses to the Use of
Different Risk Communication Tools in Simulated Consultations: A Focus Group Study, 319
BRIT. MEDICAL J. 749 (1999). See also European Commission Pharmaceutical Committee, A
Guideline on the Readability of the Label and Package Leaflet of Medicinal Products for
Human Use, (1998) 22 anx. 1b, available at http://www.alims.gov.rs/download-eng/regulativa/
gl981002.pdf (recommending that frequency of drugs side-effects be described with one of
five qualitative descriptions-very rare, rare, uncommon, common, very common).
105 For example, describing a four-week-old fetus as a "human being" or a "cluster of
cells" may be equally accurate; informed consent doctrine offers no guidance between the two
options.
106 For a legal parallel, consider the Casey undue burden standard for limiting state regu-
lations of abortion. See infra note 129.
2011] 25
26 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
in this context: persuasion and manipulation.10 7 They conclude that per-
suasion, whereby a physician appeals to reason in an effort to encourage
a patient to reach a particular conclusion, is acceptable as long as the
physician does not make emotional appeals intended to provoke poten-
tially overwhelming emotional responses. 0 s In many clinical situations,
particularly those where lack of treatment is likely to result in serious
harm, medical ethicists note that physicians would be "morally blame-
worthy if they did not attempt to persuade their patients" to reach a par-
ticular decision or consent to a particular intervention. 109
Manipulation, on the other hand, is defined as "any intentional and
successful influence of a person by non-coercively altering the actual
choices available to the person or by non-persuasively altering the
other's perception of these choices.'" 0 It can include information ma-
nipulation-by managing information in a way that non-persuasively al-
ters a patient's understanding and motivates the patient to do what the
physician intends'I'-manipulation of options, and psychological ma-
nipulation.11 2 According to Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp, the extent
to which manipulation is permissible as part of the informed consent pro-
cess depends on the degree to which it is compatible with patient auton-
omy and "substantial understanding."" 3 In other words, manipulation,
particularly minor manipulation, occasionally may be justified.114 More-
over, as a matter of routine medical practice, persuasion and manipula-
tion are quite common. 1 5
107 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 644, at 133-35. They also distinguish these
from coercion, which involves the threat of force and is usually impermissible.
108 Id. at 133. See also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 644, at 346-52.
109 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 644, at 347. See also BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS,
supra note 644, at 308 (citing the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs' policy with
respect to HIV-positive patients who are reluctant to disclose their status to a partner, which
recommends that the physician in such a case "attempt to persuade the infected patient to cease
endangering the third party"); Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medi-
cal Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 85, 89
(2010) (noting that patients making treatment decisions seek and need the "advice of their
treating physician").
110 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 644, at 354.
111 Id. at 355. Information manipulation can include lying, withholding information, ex-
aggerating, or framing information in a negative or positive way.
112 Id. at 355. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Pater-
nalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159 (2003).
113 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 64, at 362.
1 14 Id.
115 See supra accompanying text at note 258-59, 354. See also Janet Smith, Guided
Autonomy and Good Friend Physicians, in BIoETHics wT-H LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: THEMES IN
THE WORK OF JOSEPH M. BOYLE, 166 (Christopher Tollefsen, ed., 2011) ("[N]early every
health care professional, no matter how relativistic in his/her philosophical commitments, rou-
tinely utilizes a bag of tricks for persuasion, manipulation and coercion, not unlike those of a
parent dealing with a willful child[.]"); John F. Peppin, Physician Neutrality and Patient Au-
tonomy in Advance Directive Decisions, II ISSUES L. & MED. 13, at 15-16 (1995) (describing
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As a legal matter, neutrality has not been a required part of the in-
formed consent process since the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in
Casey overruled Thornburg and Akron to the extent they prohibited state
attempts to influence a woman's abortion choice.' 16 In Casey, the Su-
preme Court held that state laws may legitimately reflect a preference for
life over abortion.' 17 In other contexts as well-most notably, end-of-
life and public health contexts-American law also permits the state to
interject its own value judgments into the sphere of medical decision-
making, though these interventions have faced similar constitutional
challenges. 18
Moreover, even a physician who strenuously avoids manipulation
and persuasion may have motivations or expectations that impact patient
care. Consider, for example, a patient who repeatedly declines a clini-
cally-recommended treatment without offering a reason for his decision.
It would be unusual for a physician to accept this decision at first glance.
More likely, the physician will call for a psychiatric consult to evaluate
the person's competence. Obviously, there is nothing inherently wrong
with determining a patient's psychiatric status before allowing the patient
to give informed consent-after all, competence and voluntariness are
essential to the consent process. But the fact that physicians routinely
call for psychiatric consults only when they disagree with a patient's de-
cision indicates that the values and motivations of medical professionals
are clearly at play in the informed consent process.
Finally, even a physician who strives for neutrality and objectivity
in disclosure may find this attitude difficult to maintain. The way a phy-
sician frames or presents information that affects patient decision-making
is necessarily dependent on the physician's own attitude. As Minkoff
and Marshall note, "[plotential for undue bias exists even when physi-
cians frame their counseling carefully, since their choice of words, of
"manipulation of the consent process" aimed at persuading patients to accept treatment as a
daily occurrence); Edmund Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights
and Obligations in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
47, 55 (1994) ("As any clinician knows, she can get almost any decision she wants from most
patients."); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STov OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL Research, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHI-
CAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTrIONER RELA-
TIONSHIP 63-68 (1982) (noting how easy physicians believe it is to "package and present the
facts in a way that leaves the patient with no real choice").
116 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
117 Id.
11S See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding as
constitutional, on the basis of a permissible state preference for life over death, a Missouri law
requiring a party petitioning for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment to demonstrate the
patient's wishes by clear and convincing evidence).
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emphasis, and even of body language unwittingly transmits bias."119
This is a problem of practical application rather than theory, but it calls
into question the feasibility of a doctrine of informed consent that aspires
to complete neutrality.120 While the aspirational goal of defining the
scope and manner of informed consent disclosures using neutral and un-
biased medical information is laudable, it is questionable whether even
the most stringent procedures for assuring such neutrality can effectively
be shielded from political and personal agendas. 121
III. A FEW MODEST RECOMMENDATIONS
Many opponents of abortion disclosure laws paint the doctrine of
informed consent as grounded in neutrality. They argue that the content
of disclosure should not be influenced by special interests, that physi-
cians ought to refrain from persuading patients to reach a favored deci-
sion, that appeals to emotion are inappropriate, and that disclosures ought
to be limited to medically relevant facts. And yet Section II demon-
strates that this view of informed consent may be overly simplistic. As a
matter of ethics, informed consent regards broad disclosure as necessary
for the exercise of patient autonomy, encourages disclosure of patient-
specific information, and permits the use of rational persuasion and in-
formation manipulation. As a matter of positive law, informed consent
requirements inevitably incorporate value judgments about the primacy
of patient, as opposed to physician, interests and the reasonableness of
119 Minkoff & Marshall, supra note 3, at 22. See also Pellegrino, Patient and Physician
Autonomy, supra note 113 at 55 (1994) ("Which facts the physician chooses, which she em-
phasizes, and which she represses are often subtly or frankly conditioned by her judgment of
what she thinks is in the patient's best interests.").
120 At least one commentator, who has described the belief that "physicians work from a
morally neutral position" as "naive," responds to this dilemma by suggesting that physicians
instead honestly divulge their values when communicating with patients. Peppin, supra note
1155, at 14.
121 Consider, for example, PPACAs prioritization of funding for shared decision-making
using patient decision aids, particularly in the context of preference-sensitive care. Pub. L. No.
11 1-148, § 931(c)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 119, 381-384. PPACA directs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to contract with an entity comprised of "experts and key stakeholders" to craft
"consensus-based" standards for evaluating patient decision aids. Id. at § 936, 124 Stat. at
527-30. This language was obviously crafted to ensure the scientific accuracy and defensibil-
ity of the resulting decision aids. However, one need look no further than the heated opposi-
tion of many established physicians to implementation of shared decision-making, patient
decision aids, and even clinical pathways based on evidence-based medicine to recognize how
difficult it will be for even a group of experts to reach consensus about the nature of the
information to be communicated to patients via decision aids. Many thanks to the participants
in the Salzburg Global Seminar, Session 477, "The Greatest Untapped Resource in Health-
care? Informing and Involving Patients in Decisions about their Medical Care," particularly
Ben Moulton of the Foundation for Informed Medical Decision Making, for their feedback and
reflection on this and related issues.
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patient decision-making. Moreover, practically, it is simply impossible
to attain the sort of neutrality many commentators desire.
Recognizing the nuance and flexibility inherent in informed consent
doctrine makes it much more difficult to accept the argument that mod-
em abortion disclosure laws are inherently incompatible with informed
consent. This is not to say that the argument from informed consent
lacks merit and should be abandoned in its entirety. Viewing the doc-
trine of informed consent in its true light still permits legitimate, albeit
more modest, criticism of abortion disclosure laws. This Section at-
tempts to identify, where possible, which elements of abortion disclosure
laws are problematic, even in light of the more complex view of in-
formed consent this Article espouses.
A. Bias
First, consider the argument that abortion disclosure laws are biased
and non-neutral, aimed primarily at persuading patients to continue with
their pregnancy rather than encouraging independent choice. Examples
of such bias include presenting selective information-by disclosing the
risks associated with abortion but not childbirth, for example; framing
information in a manner that paints abortion in a negative light; high-
lighting visual information that is likely to trigger fear or negative emo-
tional responses in patients; and presenting evidence against abortion that
the scientific community disputes. As shown in Section II, it is impossi-
ble to dissociate the theory of informed consent from underlying social
values and biases about reasonable patient decision-making. The doc-
trine of informed consent offers little guidance as to how to disclose rele-
vant information, and it recognizes, as both an ethical and legal matter,
that the use of persuasion in medical practice is permissible and some-
times necessary.
Is it possible to reach any firm conclusions about the legitimacy of
non-neutral disclosure requirements? Perhaps not. While neutrality and
objectivity in the informed consent process should be the ultimate goal, it
is not clear that state laws supporting biased disclosures are per se imper-
missible. In some cases, as where a patient's requested treatment con-
flicts with the physician's ethical obligations, such as a physician's
opposition to abortion on religious grounds, encouraging the patient to
pursue a different option may be permissible ethically, provided that the
physician's persuasive influence does not negate the patient's ability to
make an autonomous choice. Similarly, where a state has determined
that existing disclosures are biased in favor of abortion, and if as many
pro-life advocates claim,' 22 abortion providers intentionally avoid dis-
122 See, e.g., Avila, supra note 37 at 513.
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cussing fetal characteristics with the patient, it may be permissible for a
state to remedy this bias by balancing the information that is made avail-
able to patients. All such decisions need to be made on a case-by-case
and law-by-law basis. Moreover, even if we conclude that obtaining a
patient's truly informed consent requires disclosing information with
which the patient disagrees, there may be other legal limitations on the
state's right to legislate such issues. 123
B. Factual Accuracy
The doctrine of informed consent requires that factual information
disclosed to patients be accurate. 12 4 This much is clear. But neither in-
formed consent theory nor any other ethical or legal theory provides gui-
dance on how to disclose information where there is no clear consensus
in the scientific community.12 5 Proponents of breast cancer and fetal
pain disclosures argue that because there are published studies support-
ing their position, patients ought to be provided with this information.
Critics of such disclosures argue that the existence of one or two studies
supporting a correlation does not mean that there is legitimate scientific
dispute on an issue.
When there is a lack of consensus on a scientific issue or when there
is no agreement as to the fact of consensus, what conclusions, if any, can
be reached about the legitimacy of disclosure requirements? One solu-
tion would be to require a disclosure that alerts patients to the conflict.
For example, "[w]hile the majority of the scientific community believes
there is no reliable evidence of a link between abortion and future infer-
tility, some researchers have argued that there is." The problem with this
approach is that it suggests to patients that there is a legitimate scientific
dispute about an issue that most scientists believe is not in question. Ar-
guably, disclosing such information would permit patients, many of
whom lack the education and training to understand medical and public
health research, to reach their own conclusions about an issue that the
scientific peer review process has essentially settled. While a populist
trend to this effect seems to have been developing in recent years,126 it
does not seem unreasonable to require legislatures and courts to defer to
the opinion of a majority of the scientific community when setting dis-
123 See infra Section IV.
124 As does the "truthful and not misleading" doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in
Casey.
125 See Post, supra note 51, at 988.
126 Similar arguments have been raised in the context of global warming and climate
change: although some researchers offer evidence to suggest that there is no such phenomenon
as man-made global warning, the majority of the scientific community disagrees with this
view. The alleged link between vaccination and autism, which has since been discredited, is
another example.
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closure requirements, where there is consensus on factual issues relating
to the risks of abortion.127  Given that states have discretion as to
whether to require specific risk disclosures, state legislators who disagree
with the conclusions drawn by the scientific community about an issue
like fetal pain, either as a matter of evidence or of policy, are free to
simply avoid legislating disclosure of factual information relating to this
issue. In light of the fact that states are taking the initiative to require
factual disclosures, the burden should be on the legislators to demon-
strate that their disclosures are factually correct as judged by the scien-
tific and medical communities as a whole.12 8
C. Materiality and Misunderstanding
With respect to the issues of materiality and inclusion of potentially
misleading value-based judgments, informed consent doctrine is surpris-
ingly unhelpful. As an ethical matter, informed consent requires disclo-
sure of information that would assist the individual patient in her
decision; legally, informed consent requires disclosure of information
based on a reasonable patient or reasonable physician standard. Thus,
whether a piece of information is material is largely dependent on social
norms and context.
If required disclosures ought to be limited to information that is
medically material, the reason for that limitation cannot be because non-
medical information is irrelevant to patients.12 9 Presumably, the reason
we impose a medical materiality restriction on medical disclosures is be-
cause the physician who initiates the informed consent conversation is
less qualified to speak on non-medical issues. As noted in Section II,
physicians are trained as medical practitioners and may not be well-
versed in issues like the financial resources states make available to wo-
men with children, the religious or moral perspectives on fetal develop-
ment, the availability of adoption services, or the effect of the abortion
127 See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 14, at 114 (arguing that disclosures of "specific factual
claims" should be "subject to non-deferential judicial review of their accuracy and fairness.");
Borgmann, supra note 59 (arguing that courts neglect their responsibility for justice and truth
when they defer to biased and unreliable legislative fact-finding on abortion). See also
Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, --- F.3d ---- , 2011 WL 3862585, at *8 (8th Cir. 2011) ("A
compelled medical statement that contradicts in unequivocal terms the leading associations of
experts in relevant fields does not serve [the end of facilitating informed decisions].").
128 For example, PPACA, which promotes the use of patient decision aids to facilitate
shared decision-making, requires that such decision aids be "evidence-based" and present "up-
to-date clinical evidence about the risks and benefits of treatment options." Pub. L, No. 111-
148, § 3506(d), 124 Stat. 119, 527. PPACA also requires that such patient decision aids be
evaluated and certified by a diverse group of experts and stakeholders; this is likely to ensure
some degree of consensus about the accuracy of disclosed information. Id. at § 3506(c)(2)(a).
But see supra note 103 and accompanying text (questioning whether such unbiased consensus
can ever be reached).
129 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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decision on third parties or society as a whole. Consequently, while the
Supreme Court has found no constitutional prohibition against requiring
physicians to disclose such information, 130 requiring these types of dis-
closures seems inconsistent with the principle of informed consent. The
fact that informed consent takes place within the physician-patient rela-
tionship strongly suggests that the information conveyed ought to be
medical in nature. 131
That said, it is important to note that some of the information cur-
rently required by abortion disclosure statutes need not be conveyed by
the physician directly but may instead be communicated (as often occurs)
in the form of a state pamphlet. To the extent that abortion disclosure
laws require conveyance of non-medical information, such laws would
be more consistent with informed consent doctrine if the state, rather
than the physician, were to make the disclosures. As a matter of conve-
nience and practicality, it is understandable that a state wishing to convey
non-medical information to women seeking abortions would find a home
for this communication at the time of the physician-patient encounter.
But it must be emphasized that introducing the state's communicative
message at this particular time and place can only be defended as a mat-
ter of convenience-and not because state speech is relevant to, analo-
gous to, or part of the informed consent dialogue between physician and
patient. For this reason, any brochures or pamphlets provided by the
state ought to be clearly identified as coming from the state, so as not to
mislead patients into thinking that these communications are medical in
nature or endorsed by the physician.132 Ideally, these state communica-
tions would be made outside the context of medical care.
130 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882-83 (1992) ("We
would think it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to be informed
consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with information about
risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself.").
131 In a somewhat related context, an earlier version of the 2008 Prenatally and
Postnatally Diagnosed Conditions Awareness Act would have required physicians to disclose
to parents receiving a prenatal diagnosis of Downs syndrome or other disabling conditions
information about families living with disabilities in an effort to better inform their choices.
See S. 1810, 110th Cong. § 3(d) (as introduced in Senate, Jul. 18, 2007). This language was
eliminated in the final version of the Act. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author). In her Article, Emens proposes that families of dis-
abled children (or fetuses) be provided with information about the quality of life of disabled
individuals and their families, whether through conversation with a medical practitioner, writ-
ten brochures, or videos. Emens presents a thoughtful challenge to reliance on medical materi-
ality in defining the bounds of physician disclosure; she argues that emphasizing medical risk
is in itself a social and value-laden decision, as recognized by the disability studies movement.
132 However, even a clear indication that an abortion-related communication is coming
from the state may be problematic if is incorporated as part of informed consent process.
Consider for example the State of Michigan, which offers an online alternative to the tradi-
tional informed consent process. That is, a patient seeking an abortion may, rather than engag-
ing in a conversation with her physician, independently view state-sponsored abortion
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D. Emotional Impact
Traditional informed consent doctrine establishes that persuasion of
patients is permissible only if it relies on reason rather than emotions.
Autonomous decision-making is grounded in reasoned judgment, schol-
ars assert, 133 and attempts to sway a patient's opinion in non-rational
ways are ethically impermissible. Based on these descriptions alone, one
would be inclined to conclude that abortion disclosure requirements with
a significant emotional impact-most notably, fetal images-are imper-
missible. However, it may be worth challenging traditional informed
consent doctrine and its implications with respect to the issue of emo-
tional impact.
As a preliminary matter, it may be unrealistic to view autonomous
decision-making as necessarily grounded in rational analysis. People
make decisions-in the medical context and elsewhere-based on a vari-
ety of factors, not all of which are well reasoned or rationally analyzed.
For example, a patient with an irrational fear of needles may avoid get-
ting an annual flu shot. Can we really say that his decision is non-auton-
omous? Likewise, decisions made by a patient while in the grip of
excruciating pain may not be rational but are arguably autonomous and
in that patient's interests.13 4 Perhaps, then, there is a case to be made
that emotional judgments may indeed be consistent with personal
autonomy.
One might, of course, make the argument that while patients are
free to make decisions beyond the bounds of reason and rationality, it
ought to be impermissible for third parties, such as physicians, to use
certain means of persuasion that prey on patients' emotions. There may
indeed be something to this argument as a general matter.135 But readers
should proceed with care when considering the application of this argu-
ment in the abortion context. For example, one of the claims that critics
of ultrasound requirements commonly make is that showing a woman
seeking an abortion the ultrasound image of her fetus, while not objec-
tionable as a matter of factual accuracy, transforms the fetus "from an
materials at the website of the Michigan Department of Community Health, print and sign a
confirmation form, and present it to her physician at her next appointment as evidence of
informed consent. MICHIGAN DEP'T OF CTY. HEALTH, http://www.michigan.gov/mdchl0,
1607,7-132-2940_4909-45202-,00.html http://michigan.gov/mdch (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
133 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
134 For a classic example of this kind of reasoning, consider the case of Dax Cowart, who,
immediately after suffering third-degree bums over the majority of his body, asked a passing
farmer to shoot him and put him out of his misery. Over many years of painful treatment,
Coward continued to request assistance in suicide from friends, family, and physicians, who all
denied his requests on the basis that his decision-making was an emotional response to pain,
rather than a rational decision. DAX's CASE (Unicorn Media, Inc. 1985).
135 See supra Section II.C; see also Sanger supra note 3, at 403--04 (discussing a parallel
in the context of jury deliberations).
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abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting mother," and
thereby has an emotional impact far beyond its factual impact.136 While
this may be true, excessive reliance on such arguments in the context of
abortion and reproductive decision-making runs the risk of supporting
entrenched assumptions about women's emotional vulnerability-as-
sumptions that critics of abortion disclosure laws expressly, and rightly,
reject.' 37 Consider, for example, Maya Manian's thoughtful analysis of
the Supreme Court's decision in Carhart, which she criticizes, in part, on
the grounds that the Court's opinion treats women as "less trustworthy
decision-makers."1 38 Manian and others note that in no other context
have courts been willing to restrict the availability of a medical proce-
dure on the basis that patients might later come to regret their choice. 13 9
Similarly, in arguably no other context do physicians base their decision
to use medical imaging, such as X-rays, on the patient's emotional
vulnerability.
Is there a happy middle ground between acknowledging the poten-
tial dangers of excessive emotional influence and avoiding characteriza-
tions of women as particularly sensitive to emotional imagery? One
solution may be found in the doctrine of patient waiver, an important but
rarely used element of informed consent law and theory. According to
the waiver doctrine, patients may waive their right to informed consent
as an exercise in autonomy. For example, a patient who is committed to
undergoing a medical procedure, regardless of the risks or costs, may
waive her right to receive information from the physician and simply
proceed with the treatment. Once a patient has exercised her right to
waiver, it is wrong for the physician to try to share information with the
patient against her will. Of course, physicians are under no moral or
legal obligation to treat patients who waive their right to informed con-
sent-one can certainly imagine a physician refusing to provide care to a
patient who is unwilling to listen to basic information about a procedure
and its risks. However, this is the choice of the individual physician and
impacts only the availability of treatment; it does not impact the patient's
right to shield herself from information she would prefer not to know.
In this regard, any law that forces a physician to provide a woman
seeking an abortion with specific information, particularly against her
will-be it ultrasound images, images of fetal development, or descrip-
tions of the fetus-is legally and ethically problematic. The challenge is
finding a way to explain to a patient what information is available to her
136 Sanger, supra note 3, at 378.
137 See generally Dresser, supra note 3, at 1599 ("[The special-protection rationale im-
putes to women a psychological vulnerability that lacks evidentiary support.").
138 Manian, supra note 3, at 255.
139 Id. at 257-58; Dresser, supra note 3, at 1599.
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without running afoul of her right to refuse information, but this chal-
lenge is resolvable. One way of resolving this would be to begin the
informed consent discussion by asking the patient what information she
considers relevant and what information she would prefer not to hear-
although this approach, applied in the abortion context exclusively, again
runs the risk of buying into assumptions about women's emotional vul-
nerability. Perhaps another alternative is to take a cue from identity and
discrimination theory: to the extent we believe that women requesting
abortions are expressly rejecting their maternal identity, we should reject
mandated disclosures that reinforce this identity against the patient's
will.140
E. Assumptions about Women
The goal of informed consent is to encourage autonomous medical
decision-making. If we, as a liberal and enlightened society, believe that
women are equally as capable as men in this regard, it would be inappro-
priate to enact abortion disclosure laws that rely on outdated and discrim-
inatory assumptions about women's capacity for rational thought.
Of course, few proponents of abortion disclosure laws are willing to
defend these laws explicitly on the basis of backward opinions about
women. Indeed, one would hope and expect that modern policymakers
do not maintain such opinions or, if they do, that they recognize the inap-
propriateness of relying on such opinions when enacting legislation. To
the extent that informed consent laws appear "unique" to the context of
abortion, this Article argues that it is most likely because of the inherent
controversy about the sanctity of life underlying the abortion debate,141
140 That is, while physicians would still be required to disclose clinically-relevant infor-
mation about the abortion procedure, they would be limited in their ability to make disclosures
aimed at reinforcing or encouraging the maternal-fetal relationship, on the grounds that a wo-
man seeking an abortion has already rejected the maternal identity. See, e.g., Law, supra note
28, at 297 ("Typically, women go to abortion clinics because they believe that they want an
abortion.").
This limitation would likely bar the use of ultrasound images that arguably transform the
fetus "from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting mother[." See
supra note 132 and accompanying text. For mandated disclosures about the relationship be-
tween mother and fetus, see supra note 23 and see accompanying text for information about
social supports for women with children. Many thanks to Elizabeth Glazer for encouraging
me to explore this idea in the context of identity theory.
141 See Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1044 (D.
Neb. 2010). In this case, the court noted,
No . . . legislative concern for the health of women, or of men, has given rise to any
remotely similar informed-consent statutes applicable to other medical procedures,
regardless of whether such procedures are elective or non-elective, and regardless of
whether such procedures pose an equal or greater threat to the physical, mental, and
emotional health of the patient. From a plain reading of the language of the bill, and
the absence of any similar statutory 'protections' for the health of patients in other
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rather than overt or even implicit sexism, as some have suggested.14 2
Evidence in support of this argument can be found in the trend towards
increased regulation of the process of informed consent in the context of
extraction, research, and treatment involving embryos and embryonic
stem cells-a similarly controversial area. 143
If there is no underlying discriminatory intent behind abortion in-
formed consent laws, might we object to them on the basis of discrimina-
tory effect? An analogy could be drawn to the Civil Rights Act, which.
allows a plaintiff to make a claim for racial discrimination based upon a
showing of disparate impact; the plaintiff may then recover only if the
defendant is unable to identify a legitimate reason for its policy or if the
plaintiff can show that the defendant has failed to adopt a reasonable
alternative policy that does not have a discriminatory effect.144 The un-
due burden standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Casey also recog-
nizes that a burdensome effect can be just as problematic as a
burdensome intent. In Casey, the Court defined "undue burden" as
"shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus.""45 Again, it is difficult to make any con-
clusive judgments about the legal or ethical validity of abortion disclo-
sure laws on these grounds, and perhaps the strongest claim to be made is
that each law ought to be evaluated independently for the possibility of
discriminatory intent or effect.
CONCLUSION
Proponents of abortion disclosure laws endorse them as essential to
the informed consent process. Critics argue that only if a woman has
viewed images of the stages of fetal development, been offered the op-
portunity to view an ultrasound image of her fetus and hear its heartbeat,
been told that her fetus is a human being, and been provided with infor-
mation about available support services, can she truly make an informed
decision about whether or not to abort. Opponents of the new abortion
disclosure laws, on the other hand, maintain that policymakers who use
the rhetoric of informed consent to support such laws are in fact limiting
women's opportunities for autonomous medical choice. They argue that
contexts, this Court infers that the objective underlying LB 594 is the protection of
unborn human life.
Id.
142 See generally Siegel, supra note 37.
143 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. Il IL § 4 (2010); Raynard S. Kington, National
Institute of Health Guidelines on Human Stem Cell Research (2009), http://stemcells.nih.gov/
policy/2009guidelines.htm.
144 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
145 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
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such laws are biased, ideological, discriminatory, and therefore inconsis-
tent with the doctrine of informed consent.
This Article has sought to demonstrate that the reality, as so often
happens, falls somewhere in between. Certainly, some proponents of
abortion disclosure laws seem motivated less by a desire to encourage
autonomous decision-making, and more by a desire to dissuade women,
by whatever means, from choosing abortion. On the other hand, some
critics relying on the argument from informed consent seem to be draw-
ing on a simplistic conception of the informed consent doctrine that fails
to take into account the doctrine's inherent dependence on social values.
A nuanced view of informed consent doctrine will be helpful in
resolving the heated debate surrounding abortion disclosure statutes. If
ethical and legal theories of informed consent should influence state
abortion policies, reliance on informed consent must be grounded in rec-
ognizable doctrine rather than ideological rhetoric and knee-jerk re-
sponses. Unfortunately for some, the more nuanced understanding of
informed consent presented here does not lend itself to generalizations
about the legitimacy of abortion disclosure laws as a whole. However, it
is likely to benefit both proponents and critics of such laws as they tailor
their arguments to more accurately reflect underlying doctrine. For ex-
ample, it can be used to support more modest-and in turn more defensi-
ble-challenges to some abortion informed-consent laws, such as those
requiring disclosure of factual information that is not supported by the
scientific community, physician disclosure of information that is not
medically material and ought more properly be distributed by the state,
and disclosure of information or images against a patient's will.
Finally, readers should remember that this Article addresses only
one of the arguments commonly raised against abortion disclosure
laws-the argument from informed consent. Although some of these
laws do in fact violate traditional doctrines of informed consent, it is by
no means clear that informed consent doctrine ought to be the only prin-
ciple guiding legislation in this context. The state has a variety of inter-
ests beyond promoting autonomous patient decision-making and the
argument from informed consent does not explain adequately why the
sphere of doctor-patient communication should be insulated from other
important governmental goals. Indeed, in the public health context,
courts and legislators expressly reject informed consent principles to fur-
ther more pressing societal interests.14 6 The most relevant limitations,
therefore, are constitutional in nature.
146 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding a compulsory vacci-
nation constitutional despite petitioner's medical objections). Admittedly, however, the very
obvious public health threats posed by patients who refuse treatment during pandemics and
epidemics are different in kind from the threat posed by women who choose abortions.
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Some legal scholars, most notably Robert Post, have addressed this
question from a First Amendment perspective,14 7 but to date courts have
not been particularly accommodating to such arguments.14 8 Others have
analyzed whether abortion disclosure laws violate women's right to re-
productive privacy.149 While such arguments-at least with respect to
informed consent requirements-have not been particularly successful in
the past,' 50 it is worth considering whether future challenges might be
strengthened by forging a more explicit connection between the constitu-
tional undue burden test and bioethical principles regarding patient au-
tonomy, voluntariness, and third-party persuasion.' 5
Another potentially promising approach for addressing abortion dis-
closure requirements is the relatively simple policy argument on the mer-
its of mandated disclosure to address broader societal issues. For
example, in a more general context, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schnei-
der have argued that lawmakers err when they adopt mandated disclosure
as a solution to social problems without considering whether disclosure
is likely to be an effective solution. 152
Although they are outside the scope of this Article, these constitu-
tional and policy arguments will likely have a greater impact on future
policy than the contemporary arguments grounded in informed consent.
This Article lays the groundwork for a continuation of this critical debate
among medical ethicists and health law scholars.
147 Post, supra note 51. See also Robbins, supra note 51; Whitney D. Pile, The Right to
Remain Silent: A First Amendment Analysis of Abortion Informed Consent Laws, 73 Mo. L.
REV. 243 (2008).
148 Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (holding that physicians' First Amendment rights are "impli-
cated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regula-
tion by the State"). See also Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 737-38 (8th Cir.
2008) (holding that Planned Parenthood's evidence did not establish a likelihood of proving a
First Amendment violation); Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458-59 (W.D. Ky.
2000) (holding that physicians' First Amendment rights are not violated when the state com-
pels them to pay for and distribute ideological speech with which they disagree); but see
Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that revocation of physicians' DEA
registration on the basis of their recommendation of medical marijuana violates physicians'
First Amendment rights); Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d
1025, 1048 (D. Neb. 2010) ("Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence that disclosures
mandated by LB 594, if applied literally, will require medical providers to give untruthful,
misleading and irrelevant information to patients. Accordingly, the First Amendment rights of
medical providers are implicated by the bill's mandates, and the Plaintiffs have demonstrated a
likelihood of success of the merits of their First Amendment claim."); Planned Parenthood v.
Rounds, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 3862585 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that South Dakota's require-
ment that physicians disclose untruthful information about risk factors relating to abortion
violates the First Amendment rights of physicians).
149 See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 599; Dresser, supra note 3, at 1621; Sanger, supra
note 3; Siegel, supra note 37.
150 See Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
151 See Siegel, supra note 37 (presenting a dignity-based analysis of Casey and Carhart).
152 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 433, at 22-23.
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